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Abstract
We study the market partition between two distinct firms that deliver services to waiting time sensitive customers. In our
model, the incoming customers select a firm on the basis of its posted price, the expected waiting time and its brand. More
specifically, we quantify by a cost any departure from the ideal brand expected by each incoming customer. Considering
that the two underlying queueing processes operate under high traffic regimes, we analyze the market sharing dynamics by
using a diffusion process. As a function of control parameters, such as the waiting and brand departure costs or the incom-
ing traffic intensity, we are able to analytically characterize a transition between an Hotelling-like regime (dominated by
brand considerations) and a deadline type regime (dominated by waiting time considerations). The market sharing dyna-
mics is described by the time evolution of a boundary point, which time evolution belongs to the class of noise-induced
phase transitions, so far widely discussed in physics, chemistry and biology. Explicit illustrations for both symmetric
(i.e. identical servers) and asymmetric cases are worked out.
! 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In his original contribution [7], Hotelling did consider the case where two vendors supply an identical prod-
uct that is perceived homogeneous by incoming customers. However, the vendors being separated in geo-
graphical space, transportation costs to be added to the mill prices charged by the vendors are generated.
In presence of two vendors, it exists an inner market boundary point, for which the mill price plus the trans-
portation costs from both suppliers break even. This seminal modeling framework has stimulated a wealth of
contributions with the goal to relax some of the oversimplifying hypothesis of the original model. In partic-
ular, the introduction of elastic demands (i.e. customers are not prepared to pay ‘‘prohibitive prices’’ for the
product) has been discussed in [10]. Note that the original Hotelling’s model is basically deterministic – it
indeed does not incorporate random perturbations which actually may corrupt the prices and then affect
the customers’ decision process. Among the numerous potential noise sources, one of the simplest and most
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natural way to incorporate randomness is to consider the situations where the customers’ decision to select one
of the vendors depends on the expected time delay before service. This simple and realistic situation has been
recently proposed by Cachon and Harker in [2,3]. As these authors clearly emphasized in [2], the resulting
inherent analytical complexity implies that rather seldom are the models dealing with firms that simulta-
neously compete with both prices and processing rates. The aim of this note is to investigate a class of simple
models for which explicitly analytical considerations can partly be worked out. While in [2] the firms are
assumed to adjust their processing rates to guarantee a fixed expected time cost, our class of models takes into
account the fluctuations of the waiting times and therefore keeps full track of the randomness induced by the
underlying queueing processes. Note that the adjusting processing rates assumption proposed in [2] allows a
discussion based only on averages. Contrary to [2], where no variance effects enter into the description of the
model (i.e. this is effectively a ‘‘pseudo-stochastic’’ model), our approach explicitly emphasizes the role played
by the fluctuations variance – also called in the sequel the ‘‘volatility’’ of the underlying noise sources. As dis-
cussed in [5], the introduction of waiting costs in the queueing dynamics leads to the concept of externalities
(i.e. the costs induced on later incomers by a customer who is just joining the queue). In the class of models to
be discussed here, these externalities trigger the random dynamics controlling the boundary point which
defines the market partition. While, for Hotelling-like models, the interest is paid directly on the competition
between the servers (see for instance [1,3,10,11]), in the present study we exclusively focus on the market shar-
ing dynamics.
Service models where distance and quality of service enter into consideration find, among others, a prac-
tical framework in the secondary health care market. More precisely, let us consider patients who wait for
non-urgent operations, that can be mid-term planed. As said in [9], where an application of the standard
Hotelling model to the secondary health care market is proposed, patients may accept meeting monetary
and non-monetary costs inherent to distance, if they expect a positive return in term of enhanced quality
of service. Furthermore, the quality of service perceived by the patients combines different aspects, including
the time to wait for the operation to take place. Another typical situation will be met when car drivers enter-
ing into a city center are offered alternative choices between several parking lots (here we focus on two lots).
It is nowadays common to post in real time, at the entrance of the city, the number of available parking
spaces of each parking lot. The actual time required to complete a parking action, which here plays the role
of the waiting time, is clearly monotonously decreasing with the number of available spaces of the parking
lot. Hence, the selection of the best parking lot does not only depend on its location, but also on its current
content.
In Section 2, we introduce the two service providers linear market considered throughout this paper. In Sec-
tion 3, attention is restricted to the simplest case where symmetric configurations are discussed. We show that,
for heavy traffic regimes of the underlying queueing processes, the boundary point partitioning the market
interval is governed by a scalar stochastic differential equation with multiplicative noise source. For this
dynamics, it is possible to explicitly calculate the associated stationary probability measure. The multiplicative
character of the noise source offers the possibility to observe a so-called noise-induced phase transition, which
manifests itself by a change of the modal character of the stationary probability measure – a transition from a
uni- to a bimodal probability density. In the present context, the transition between these two regimes relates
to a transition between a regime where the Hotelling’s spatial (i.e. the brand) character dominates in the deci-
sion taken by the incoming customers and a regime where the time delays dominate. We explicitly work out a
simple, though fully representative, illustration belonging to our class of models. For this particular case, we
are able to fully calculate the relaxation rate (i.e. the transient regime) characterizing the approach towards the
final statistical equilibrium. The relaxation process is strongly dependent on the relative importance of the
externalities arising in the associated queueing processes. A short account devoted to simulation experiments
explicitly comforts our analytical findings. The dynamics arising for asymmetric configurations is discussed in
Section 4. Following the technique used for the symmetric case, we compute the stationary probability density
function of the boundary point when the two servers work at different service rates (i.e. dynamic asymmetry).
We also consider the cases where the two service providers charge non-equal prices and the configurations
where the two servers do not have symmetric positions with respect to the center of the market. We show that
while these static asymmetries strongly influence the transient regime, they however do not affect the station-
ary measure.
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2. Model for market sharing dynamics
As in [2], our starting point will be a two servers Hotelling’s model where two service providers S1 and S2
are located in a (linear) market confined on a segment X :¼ ½#D;þD% & R;D > 0. The positions of the service
providers are denoted respectively by x1 and x2 and satisfy x1 < x2. Let L = x2 # x1 denotes the distance
between S1 and S2. The servers S1 and S2 charge respectively prices p1 and p2. Departing now from the original
Hotelling’s model, we add queueing processes in front of S1 and S2 and following [5], we will attach waiting
costs to any customer lining in the queues before being served. Taking into account waiting costs thus confers
a dynamical character to the original Hotelling’s model. Specifically, our dynamic model exhibits the following
features and obeys to the following rules:
(a) Arrivals dynamics. Incoming customers follow a Poisson rule with rate K, hence the average time
between two arrivals will be K#1.
(b) Spatial distribution of the arrivals. Incoming customers arrive at a random location x 2 X drawn from a
uniform probability density U(X) with support on X.
(c) Services dynamics. Both servers Si, i = 1, 2, have generally distributed service times with rate li, hence the
average service time will be l#1i ; i ¼ 1; 2.
(d) Traffic intensity. The traffic into the system is limited to q :¼ Kl1þl2 < 1. This ensures that the system is
globally stable, i.e. the global incoming rate is less than the global service rate.
(e) Queueing processes. When an incoming customer finds both S1 and S2 busy, he/she will wait for service
and line-up in a queue. The capacity of the queue is assumed to be unlimited and the service discipline is
first-in-first-out (FIFO). In view of points (a) and (c), we hence consider M/G/1 queues.
(f) Customer information gathering. Upon his/her arrival at x 2 X, each incoming customer knows:
(1) his/her relative distance jx # x1j and jx # x2j to S1 and S2.
(2) the contents N1(t) and N2(t) of both queues (t 2 Rþ being the arrival time). In other words, both
queue contents are observable to any incoming customer.
(g) Cost structures. There are two types of costs incurred by any customer, namely:
(1) the waiting time cost (WTC), characterized by a cost parameter cw with physical unit ½ dollartime unit%.
(2) the brand departure cost (BDC), quantified by a cost parameter ct with physical unit
½ dollarbrand distance unit%.
(h) Decision policy. Upon arrival, an incoming customer is aware of:
– the queue contents N1(t) and N2(t),
– his/her relative position to S1 and S2,
– the values of the costs cw and ct,
– the service rates l1 and l2,
– the posted prices p1 and p2.
Based on this information set, the incoming customer decides which server S1 or S2 he/she will join.
(i) Demand structure. Following the original Hotelling’s case, we assume an inelastic demand, i.e. a cus-
tomer will purchase the service at any price, even if the proposed price is arbitrarily large.
A sketch of our modeling framework can be found in Fig. 1. Extending original Hotelling’s configuration,
waiting times confer to the above class of models an explicit dynamic character.
When served by Si, an incoming customer feels a utility function Ui(x), i = 1, 2, where x is the customer’s
initial position which enters into the decision policy. In words, the functions Ui(x) quantify the gain realized by
a customer choosing server Si when he/she enters at location x. Specifically, for linear waiting and transpor-
tation costs, the utility functions read as
UiðxÞ ¼ a# pi # ctjx# xij# cwEðW ijNiðtÞÞ; i ¼ 1; 2; ð1Þ
with a being a systematic reward due to the service and EðW i j NiðtÞÞ standing for the conditional expected
waiting time at Si when Ni(t) already waiting customers are observed. As l#1i is the average service time at
server Si, this last conditional expectation is readily given by
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EðW ijNiðtÞÞ ¼ NiðtÞli
:
We obviously assume that any customer does maximize his utility function when choosing one of the two serv-
ers. This suggests to introduce a time-dependent boundary position Yt 2 [#D,+D] implicitly defined by
U 1ðY tÞ ¼ U 2ðY tÞ: ð2Þ
Hence, our strictly increasing BDC which we assume from now on imply that Yt dynamically separates the
two monopolies held by S1 and S2. A sketch of the situation is given in Fig. 2. As Yt is a function of the
two stochastic processes N1(t) and N2(t), it will be itself a stochastic process.
Let ki(t,Yt) denotes the partial incoming rate of customers feeding Si at time t and hence:
k1ðt; Y tÞ þ k2ðt; Y tÞ ¼ K; 8t 2 Rþ: ð3Þ
In view of the assumption (b) (i.e. spatially uniform arrival on X = [#D,+D]), the partial traffic flows feeding
S1 and S2 result from the Bernoulli ‘‘thinning’’ of the incoming Poisson flow with global rate K. The branching
probability is given by P ¼ D#Y t2D and it is established [4] that the thinning produces two independent Poisson
processes with partial rates:
k1ðt; Y tÞ ¼ Dþ Y t2D K and k2ðt; Y tÞ ¼
D# Y t
2D
K: ð4Þ
For the utility functions given by Eq. (1), the time-dependent boundary point will obey, 8t 2 Rþ:
Fig. 1. Bounded market with two vendors and time sensitive customers.
Fig. 2. Cost structure as a function of the customers’ location. The total costs for a customer located at position x are the sum of the
selling price pi, the waiting time cost cwEðW ijNiðtÞÞ (identical service rates are assumed in this figure) and the brand departure cost
ctjx # xij. Any customer chooses the service provider minimizing his/her total costs (i.e. it corresponds to maximize his/her utility
function). As a consequence, all the customers standing on the left of Yt will choose S1, those on the right go to S2. The difference between
the two figures is the current queue contents. These contents determine the position of the boundary point Yt, which separates the
respective market shares held by S1 and S2.
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Y t ¼
ðaÞ cw2ct
N2ðtÞ
l2
# N1ðtÞl1
! "
þ x1þx22 þ p2#p12ct if ctLP jWj;
ðbÞ þ D if ctL < W;
ðcÞ # D if ctL < #W;
8>><>: ð5Þ
where
W :¼ WðN 1ðtÞ;N 2ðtÞ; l1; l2; p1; p2Þ ¼ p2 # p1 þ cw
N 2ðtÞ
l2
# N 1ðtÞ
l1
# $
:
In case (a), Yt 2 [x1,x2] & [#D,+D]. Indeed in this case, the BDC from one server to the other (i.e. ctL) is great-
er than the global difference between the prices and the WTC’s of the two servers (i.e. jWj). Hence, a customer
located near the server having the longest queue will choose this server anyway. In cases (b) and (c), any cus-
tomer in the whole interval [#D,+D] joins the server having the shortest queue. Indeed, the gain in WTC (due
to the difference between the queue contents) and in price exceeds the BDC incurred by the distance from one
server to the other. A representation of the dynamics induced by Eq. (5) for a particular choice of the control
parameters is found in Fig. 3.
We now separately discuss the symmetric and the asymmetric configurations.
3. Symmetric configurations
The positions of the service providers are assumed to satisfy #D 6 x1 6 0 and 0 6 x2 6 + D and they are
located symmetrically with respect to the center of the market, i.e. x1 = # x2. Furthermore, the servers S1 and
S2 offer homogenous services l1 = l2 = l and both charge an equal price p1 = p2 = p.
Let Ai(t), Di(t) and Ni(t) respectively denote the numbers of arrivals, departures and the population in Si at
time t. From now on, we restrict ourselves to heavy traffic regimes characterized by q ¼ K2l ¼ 1# !, with !
small. Writing
–5000 –4000 –3000 –2000 –1000 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
–1
1
N2(t)–N1(t)
Y t
tanh(5 ⋅ 10–4 ⋅ (N2(t)–N1(t)))
Dynamics induced by Eq. (5)
Fig. 3. Typical representation of the boundary position dynamics for D = 1. The solid line shows the dynamics induced by Eq. (5) when
ct = 10, cw = 8 · 10#3, l1 = l2 = 1 p1 ¼ p2 ¼ 1 and x2 ¼ #x1 ¼ 34 (symmetric configuration). The dashed line shows the dynamics given by
Eq. (21) when c = 5.33 · 10#4.
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NiðtÞ ¼ AiðtÞ # DiðtÞ;
in heavy traffic the server Si has very long busy period and hence the process Ni(t) does almost never vanish,
i = 1, 2. This implies that the departure and arrival processes are almost independent. In heavy traffic regimes,
it is well established (see in particular [8]) that both queue contents at time t are well approximated by diffusion
processes of the form:
NiðtÞ ¼
Z t
0
½kiðs; Y sÞ # l%dsþ
Z t
0
V iðs; Y sÞdBi;s; i ¼ 1; 2; ð6Þ
where B1,t and B2,t are independent standard Brownian motions and the terms Vi(t,Yt) denote the state-depen-
dent ‘‘volatilities’’ given by
V iðt; Y tÞ2 ¼ kiðt; Y tÞ3r2a;i þ l3r2s;i; i ¼ 1; 2; ð7Þ
with r2a;i (respectively r
2
s;i) being the variance of the inter-arrival times (respectively the variance of the service
times) for server Si. Using Eqs. (3)–(7) and the fact that B1,t and B2,t are independent, we therefore can write:
N 2ðtÞ # N 1ðtÞ ¼ #KD
Z t
0
Y s dsþ
Z t
0
V ðs; Y sÞdBs; ð8Þ
with Bt being a standard Brownian motion and V 2ðt; Y tÞ ¼ V 1ðt; Y tÞ2 þ V 2ðt; Y tÞ2 ¼ Kþ l3ðr2s;1 þ r2s;2Þ -
remember that for Poisson processes, we have r2a;i ¼ kiðt; Y tÞ#2.
In this symmetric configuration, Eq. (5) reduces to, 8t 2 Rþ:
Y t ¼
cw
2lct
ðN 2ðtÞ # N 1ðtÞÞ if ctLP j eWj;
þD if ctL < eW;
#D if ctL < # eW;
8><>: ð9Þ
where, for this symmetric case, we define:eW ¼ WðN 1ðtÞ;N 2ðtÞ; l; l; p; pÞ ¼ cwl ðN 2ðtÞ # N 1ðtÞÞ:
To proceed further with analytical calculations, we approximate the dynamics implied by Eq. (9) by introduc-
ing an odd (due to the symmetry of the problem), effective monotonously increasing one-to-one, C2ðRÞ
function:
f ð)Þ : R! ½#1;þ1% ð10Þ
fulfilling
Y t ¼ Df ðcðN 2ðtÞ # N 1ðtÞÞÞ; ð11Þ
with
c :¼ cw
lLct
: ð12Þ
The control parameter c is dimensionless and quantifies the respective importance of the different costs. Note
that in Eq. (12), the time unit is measured in average service time.
As f is invertible, Eq. (11) can be written as
f #1
Y t
D
# $
¼ cðN 2ðtÞ # N 1ðtÞÞ: ð13Þ
Using Eq. (8), then Eq. (13) becomes
f #1
Y t
D
# $
¼ # cK
D
Z t
0
Y sdsþ c
Z t
0
V ðs; Y sÞdBs: ð14Þ
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Differentiating, we obtain:
ðf #1Þ0 Y t
D
# $
dY t ¼ #cKY t dt þ DcV ðt; Y tÞdBt; ð15Þ
which can be written as
dY t ¼ # cKY tðf #1Þ0 Y tD
% & dt þ DcV ðt; Y tÞðf #1Þ0 Y tD% & dBt: ð16Þ
In our settings (remember that we deal with M/G/1 queues), V ðt; Y tÞ ¼ V ¼
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
Kþ l3ðr2s;1 þ r2s;2Þ
q
does not de-
pend on Yt nor on t. We can thus write Eq. (16) as
dY t ¼ # cKY tðf #1Þ0 Y tD
% & dt þ DcV
f #1ð Þ0 Y tD
% & dBt: ð17Þ
The stochastic differential equation (SDE) given by Eq. (17) describes the effective dynamics of the boundary
position Yt. The White Gaussian noise dBt being merely the limit of finitely correlated processes, we assign to
the underlying stochastic integral relative to Eq. (17) the Sratonovitch’s interpretation [6]. Hence, the transi-
tion probability density P(y, tjy0, t0) describing the solution of the SDE (17) reads as
o
ot
P ðy; t j y0; t0Þ ¼FP ðy; tjy0; t0Þ; ð18Þ
with Fokker–Planck operator taking here the form, [6]:
Fð)Þ :¼ o
oy
cKy
ðf #1Þ0 yD
% & ð)Þ" #þ 1
2
o
oy
gðyÞ o
oy
gðyÞð)Þ
( )
; gðyÞ ¼ DcVðf #1Þ0 yD
% & :
The stationary probability density function Ps(y) solving Eq. (18), with vanishing left hand side, reads as
P sðyÞ ¼Nðf #1Þ0 yD
! "
exp # 2K
cD2V 2
Z y
uðf #1Þ0 u
D
! "
du
* +
ð19Þ
for y 2 [#D,+D], withN <1 a normalization constant.
Symmetry (i.e. our assumptions that x1 = # x2, l1 = l2 and p1 = p2) implies that Ps(y) = Ps(#y). In partic-
ular, studying the curvature Rð0Þ of Ps(y) at y = 0 directly furnishes information regarding the modularity of
Ps(y). From Eq. (19), we directly obtain:
signfRð0Þg ¼ signf#cV 2f 000ð0Þ # 2Kðf #1Þ0ð0Þðf 0ð0ÞÞ3g: ð20Þ
For given functions f, we observe that the sign of the curvature Rð0Þ directly depends on the values of the
(control) external parameters (here cw, ct, L, K and l) solely. A curvature sign change exhibits a transition
of regime triggered by the presence of fluctuations. This is referred as a noise-induced phase transition [6]
and an explicit illustration is now worked out.
3.1. Explicit illustration – symmetric case
Belonging to the previous class of models, the particular choice
Y t ¼ D tanhðcðN 2ðtÞ # N 1ðtÞÞÞ ð21Þ
leads to very simple algebra. A particular representation of Eq. (21), put into comparison with the dynamics
induced by Eq. (5), is found in Fig. 3.
For this particular case, the SDE (17), describing the effective boundary point dynamics, becomes:
dY t ¼ #cKY t 1# Y tD
# $2 !
dt þ DcV 1# Y t
D
# $2 !
dBt: ð22Þ
In view of Eq. (19), the corresponding stationary probability density function simply becomes:
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P sðyÞ ¼N 1# yD
! "2# $ KcV 2#1
for y 2 ½#D;þD%; ð23Þ
whereN is the normalization constant given here by
N#1 ¼ D
Z 1
0
t#
1
2ð1# tÞ KcV 2#1 dt ¼ DB 1
2
;
K
cV 2
# $
;
where Bðx; yÞ :¼ CðxÞCðyÞCðxþyÞ and C(x) stands for the Gamma function. An illustration of the probability density
function given by Eq. (23) for different values of c and D = 1 is found in Fig. 4. Regarding Eq. (20), the sign
of the curvature Rð0Þ of Ps(y) at y = 0 is here given by
Rð0Þ
> 0 when K
cV 2
< 1;
¼ 0 when K
cV 2
¼ 1;
< 0 when K
cV 2
> 1:
8><>: ð24Þ
The information given by Eq. (24) (which is in perfect agreement with what we would expect with regard to the
form of Ps(y) given by Eq. (23)) perfectly describes the modularity of Ps(y) and the underlying noise-induced
phase transition.
3.1.1. Transient behavior
For the choice given in Eq. (21), we can also study the rate of approach to the equilibrium. Indeed, by intro-
ducing the change of variables:
t 7!s ¼ c2V 2t; X t 7!Y t ¼ D tanhðX tÞ; ð25Þ
−1 −0.8 −0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
y
P s
(y)
γ=0.8
γ=0.47
γ=1.6⋅ 10−2
Fig. 4. Stationary probability density function of the time-dependent boundary position Yt when D = 1, K = 1.8, l = 1 (q = 0.9) and the
service time processes are Poisson. This density is drawn for three different values of c = [0.8;0.47;1.6 Æ 10#2]. Furthermore, when c!1
(it corresponds to purely deadline type regimes), the density is sharply peaked at y = # D = # 1 and y = + D = + 1. In the other limit,
c! 0 (corresponding to purely Hotelling-like regimes), the density is restricted to a single peak at y = 0. This graph clearly exhibits the
noise-induced phase transition arising in our dynamic model.
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the dynamics given by Eq. (22) reduces to
dX s ¼ # K
cV 2
þ 1
# $
tanhðX sÞdsþ dW s :¼ #2K tanhðX sÞdsþ dW s ð26Þ
and the time-dependent solution P(y, tjy0,0) of the associated Fokker–Planck is known for long (see for in-
stance [12]). As an illustration, let us mention that for the situations where the dimensionless parameter
K :¼ K
2cV 2
þ 12 2 N, the explicit form simplifies somewhat and is given by [12]
P ðx; tjx0; 0Þ ¼ 11þ z2 ð1þ z
2
0Þð1þ z2Þ
K
2
1
2
ffiffiffiffiffi
ps
p e#K2se#ðx#x0Þ
2
4s
( )
þ 1
pð1þ z2Þ
XK#1
n¼0
ðK # nÞ
n!Cð2K þ 1# nÞ e
#nð2K#nÞshnðx0ÞhnðxÞfnðx; x0; tÞ; ð27Þ
with the definitions:
sinhðzÞ :¼ y; f nðx; x0; tÞ :¼
1ffiffiffi
p
p
Z gðx;x0;tÞþðK#nÞ ffitp
gðx;x0;tÞ#ðK#nÞ
ffi
t
p e
#u2du; gðx; x0; tÞ :¼ arc sinhðxÞ # arc sinhðx0Þ
2
ffiffi
t
p
and the polynomials:
hnðxÞ :¼ ð#1Þn2K#nC K # nþ 12
# $
ð1þ x2ÞKþ12 d
n
dxn
ð1þ x2Þn#K#12:
In particular, the long time scale trelax governing the approach to the stationary state given by Eq. (23) is deter-
mined by the spectral gap between 0 and the first non-vanishing eigenvalue of the Fokker–Planck Eq. (18)
(remember that the vanishing eigenvalue corresponds to the stationary probability measure given by Eq.
(19)). It follows that:
1=trelax ¼
ð2K # 1Þc2V 2 ¼ Kc if K P 1;
K2c2V 2 ¼ cKþc2V 22 if K < 1:
(
ð28Þ
From Eq. (28), we can draw the following remarks:
(a) Spectral characteristics of the Fokker–Planck equation. In view of Eq. (28), there are two relaxation
regimes governed by the spectral properties of the associated Fokker–Planck Eq. (18). As discussed in
[12], for KP 1 the spectrum exhibits both discrete and continuum parts whereas for K < 1 only the con-
tinuum part survives.
(b) Regime transitions. Note that the transition from unimodal to bimodal densities given in Eq. (23) by
ð K
cV 2
# 1Þ ¼ 0 coincides with the transition in the relaxation regimes given by Eq. (28).
(c) Rate of approach to the equilibrium. When discrete eigenvalues exist, the asymptotic time relaxation
towards the single mode stationary probability density (given by Eq. (23)) is faster compared to the
relaxation rate associated with the purely continuum spectrum which drives the system to the bimodal
density (given by Eq. (23)). This can be intuitively understood in limiting regimes. Indeed, for the pure
Hotelling’s case, a situation arising when ct!1, the boundary position probability density is delta-
peaked in the middle of the market interval (remember that we did focus in this section on symmetric
configurations), and the relaxation time to reach this equilibrium is vanishingly small – this corresponds
to the deterministic scheduling which commands to ‘‘join the closest server’’. For dominating Hotelling’s
type regimes, the externalities (i.e. the waiting costs affecting incomers arriving behind a customer enter-
ing into service) have little influence on the equilibrium probability density which describes the boundary
point – this produces a fast relaxation towards the statistical equilibrium, which will be close to the lim-
iting delta-peaked density. In the contrary, when the deadline type regime dominates, a new incomer
strongly modifies the dynamical state of the system and hence strongly perturbs the underlying proba-
bility measure, thus implying long relaxation times to the statistical equilibrium. Note that for K = 0 in
Eq. (28), a situation realized when cw!1, the relaxation time diverges to infinity, meaning that no
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statistical equilibrium exists – this corresponds to the purely deterministic scheduling which commands
to always ‘‘join the server exhibiting the shortest queue’’.
3.1.2. Simulation experiments
We have simulated the dynamics of the boundary position Yt in the particular case where Yt fulfills Eq.
(21). Each customer, upon arrival, determines on which side of the boundary point Yt (dynamically given
by Eq. (21), with regard to the current content of the queues) is his/her (uniformly distributed) position
and he/she joins the queue hence chosen. We have computed an estimation of the stationary probability den-
sity function of the boundary position Yt after 10
5 customers have passed through the system. The simulation
experiments performed for different values of the control parameters (here c, K and l) confirm the presence of
the noise-induced phase transition. The particular simulation results are compared with theoretical findings
given by Eq. (23) (see Fig. 5).
4. Asymmetric configurations
Different sources of asymmetry are possible:
– Dynamic asymmetry. This situation is encountered when heterogeneous servers are operating, it is treated in
Section 4.1.
– Static asymmetry. This arises in presence of non-symmetric server locations and non-equal prices. Config-
urations where the servers have asymmetric positions with respect to the center of the market and situations
where the posted prices are different lead to analogous dynamics and are discussed in Section 4.2.
4.1. Heterogeneous servers
We treat in this section the situations where the two service providers work at different service rates l15 l2
but post the same prices p1 = p2 = p and have symmetric locations x2 = # x1. For utility functions satisfying
Eq. (1), the dynamic boundary point Yt here obeys, 8t 2 Rþ:
−1 −0.8 −0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
y
P s
(y)
Simulated
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Fig. 5. Simulated and theoretical stationary probability density function of the time-dependent boundary position Yt = D Æ
tanh(c(N2(t) # N1(t))) when D = 1, K = 1.9, l = 1 (q = 0.95), c = 5 Æ 10#2 and the service time processes are Poisson.
250 O. Gallay, M.-O. Hongler / European Journal of Operational Research 190 (2008) 241–254
Y t ¼
cw
2ct
N2ðtÞ
l2
# N1ðtÞl1
! "
if ctLP cw
,, N2ðtÞ
l2
# N1ðtÞl1
! ",,;
þD if ctL < cw N2ðtÞl2 #
N1ðtÞ
l1
! "
;
#D if ctL < cw N1ðtÞl1 #
N2ðtÞ
l2
! "
:
8>>><>>: ð29Þ
In view of Eq. (29), the dynamics is here driven by the difference between the normalized numbers of custom-
ers NiðtÞli ; i ¼ 1; 2, waiting in the different queues. While we have used the approximation given by Eq. (11) in
the symmetric case, we approximate here the dynamics implied by Eq. (29) with
Y t ¼ Df ~c N 2ðtÞl2
# N 1ðtÞ
l1
# $# $
; ð30Þ
where f is a function satisfying the same hypothesis as in the symmetric case and
~c :¼ cw
Lct
: ð31Þ
Note that ~c ¼ lc (with c being given by Eq. (12)). Following the same methodology used to derive Eqs. (6)–(8),
it ensues that:
N 2ðtÞ
l2
# N 1ðtÞ
l1
¼ K
2
Z t
0
1
l2
# 1
l1
# $
# 1
D
1
l2
þ 1
l1
# $
Y s
( )
dsþ
Z t
0
eV ðs; Y sÞdBs; ð32Þ
where, for Poisson arrival and service processes:
eV ðt; Y tÞ2 ¼ V 1ðt; Y tÞ2l21 þ V 2ðt; Y tÞ
2
l22
¼ KY t
2D
1
l21
# 1
l22
# $
þ K
2
1
l21
þ 1
l22
# $
þ 1
l1
þ 1
l2
# $
:
Starting from Eq. (30) and following the lines used to derive Eqs. (11)–(17), we obtain:
dY t ¼
~cKD
2
1
l2
# 1l1
! "
# ~cKY t2 1l1 þ 1l2
! "
ðf #1Þ0 Y tD
% &
24 35dt þ D~ceVðf #1Þ0 Y tD% & dBt: ð33Þ
Setting l1 = l2 = l in Eq. (33), we directly recover the dynamics valid in the symmetric case, given by Eq. (17).
The stationary probability density function ensuing from the dynamics stated in Eq. (33) is given by
P sðl1;l2; yÞ ¼N
ðf #1Þ0 yD
% &
eV ðt; yÞ ) exp K~cD2
Z y D 1l1 # 1l2! "# u 1l1 þ 1l2! "eV ðt; uÞ2
24 35ðf #1Þ0 u
D
! "
du
8<:
9=;; ð34Þ
where N is a normalization constant. Note that the structure of the dynamics obviously implies that
Ps(l1,l2;y) = Ps(l2,l1;#y). Remark that we consistently recover Eq. (19) when we fix l1 = l2 = l in Eq. (34).
4.1.1. Explicit illustration – asymmetric case
For the particular choice f(x) = tanh(x), we find:
P sðl1;l2; yÞ ¼N 1þ
y
D
! "#1#b#an#d
1# y
D
! "#1#bþanþdðdDþ nyÞ2ðbn#adÞn2#d2 #12; ð35Þ
where
a ¼ #~cKD
2
1
l1
þ 1
l2
# $
; b ¼ ~cKD
2
1
l1
# 1
l2
# $
; n ¼ ~c
2KD
2
1
l21
# 1
l22
# $
and
d ¼ ~c
2KD
2
1
l21
þ 1
l22
# $
þ ~c2D 1
l1
þ 1
l2
# $
:
A sketch of the stationary distributions arising for heterogeneous services is given in Fig. 6. We observe that
Ps is shifted (and biaised) to the opposite side of the most effective server. This server clearly attracts more
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customers than the slowest one. This illustrates the fact that the most effective server does enhance its market
share.
Observe that for l1 = l2 = l in Eq. (35), we consistently recover Eq. (23).
4.2. Asymmetric positions and different prices
When the two service providers are not symmetrically located with respect to the center of the market (i.e.
x15 # x2), but have equal service rates and prices, the utility functions felt by the customers are modified
such that the boundary position Yt obeys:
Y t ¼
cw
2lct
ðN 2ðtÞ # N 1ðtÞÞ þ x1þx22 if ctLP j eWj;
þD if ctL < eW;
#D if ctL < # eW:
8><>: ð36Þ
Similarly, when the service providers differ only in their posted price (i.e. p15 p2), the time-dependent bound-
ary position obeys:
Y t ¼
cw
2lct
ðN 2ðtÞ # N 1ðtÞÞ þ p2#p12ct if ctLP j bWj;
þD if ctL < bW;
#D if ctL < # bW;
8><>: ð37Þ
wherebW ¼ WðN 1ðtÞ;N 2ðtÞ; l; l; p1; p2Þ ¼ p2 # p1 þ cwl ðN 2ðtÞ # N 1ðtÞÞ:
For both cases (or a combination of them), the addition of a static asymmetry contribution is required and the
dynamics can be now approximated as
Y t ¼ Df ðcðN 2ðtÞ # N 1ðtÞ þ gÞÞ: ð38Þ
Using the same methodology as for the symmetric case, we get:
f #1
Y t
D
# $
¼ # cK
D
Z t
0
Y s dsþ c
Z t
0
V ðs; Y sÞdBs þ cg: ð39Þ
−1 −0.8 −0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
y
P s
(µ
1 
,
 
µ 2
 
; 
y)
µ1=µ2=3
µ1=4, µ2=2
µ1=4.5, µ2=1.5
−1 −0.8 −0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
y
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P s
(µ
1 
,
 
µ 2
 
; 
y)
µ1=µ2=3
µ1=3.4, µ2=2.6
µ1=4, µ2=2
Fig. 6. Stationary probability density function of the time-dependent boundary position Yt for heterogeneous service rates l15 l2 and
f(x) = tanh(x). Here, D = 1 and K = 5.7. Left: ~c ¼ 0:15 (Hotelling-like regime). Right: ~c ¼ 2:4 (deadline type regime), note that the mixed
boundary behavior of the dash–dot curve can only arise for asymmetric configurations.
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When taking the time-derivative of Eq. (39), the asymmetric contribution (i.e. cg) disappears, and we get
back to the symmetric dynamics given by Eq. (15). Hence for static asymmetry, the stationary probability
density coincides with the symmetric case, given by Eq. (19). This should in fact not come as a surprise.
Indeed, the static asymmetry manifests itself only during the transient regime. Starting with empty queues
for both servers, the boundary point is initially located closer to the less attractive (in terms of price and/or
position) server, implying thus a larger feeding rate to the most attractive one. The (static) lack of attrac-
tivity of one server will gradually be counterbalanced by a (dynamic) larger number of customers visiting
the most attractive server. Asymptotically, the stationary regime for Yt behaves as in the symmetric case.
Note however that, contrary to the symmetric case, the stationary queue contents will however not be equal
anymore.
5. Conclusion
When alternative choices between services are offered to customers, several criteria enter into their final
selection decision. There are namely static criteria such as posted prices and server locations as considered
in the original Hotelling’s model and dynamic aspects typified by the waiting times before service. It is intu-
itively clear that the negative aspects of the actual and/or perceived waiting times strongly affect the final cus-
tomers’ satisfaction and hence their decisions. As in generic situations the waiting time is an intrinsically
random quantity, it is naturally described in the context of queueing theory. Focusing on the simple duopoly
configuration, we study the (stochastic) dynamics of the frontier which defines the market partition. For heavy
traffic regimes of the underlying queueing processes, the market frontier can be described by a (random) dif-
fusion dynamics (i.e. a differential equation driven by a White Gaussian Noise) with a multiplicative noise (i.e.
a state-dependent diffusion term). It is remarkable that the stationary probability measure characterizing the
frontier process exhibits a noise-induced phase transition triggered by the values of the external control
parameters (brand departure cost, waiting time cost, service rate and spatial separation between the servers).
Note that multiplicative noise processes are not confined to physics, chemistry and biology domains where
they first have been applied, they also naturally occur in operational research, in economics and more gener-
ally in social sciences. One of the most popular illustration is clearly found in financial mathematics – the
Black–Scholes model, which is based on the geometric Brownian motion (hence a multiplicative noise pro-
cess). Note however that contrary to the simple market sharing dynamics considered here, no noise-induced
transition occurs in the financial context.
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